ADF warned for 15 years that its own weapons could cause brain injury

The Australian Defence Force was warned for years that blast overpressure from its own weapons could cause brain injury, according to freedom of information material reported by the Daily Telegraph.

The documents, as described in the report, suggest Defence had identified the risk as early as 2011 and continued to test and review exposure over the following years. The reporting says the material tracked repeated low-level blast exposure linked to training and operations, with most of it coming from friendly weapon systems rather than enemy fire.

The story raises a basic but consequential question: if Defence had long known about the risk, why has it still not established a comprehensive brain injury program for personnel and veterans exposed to blast?

What the FOI material reportedly shows

According to the Daily Telegraph, internal Defence warnings about mild traumatic brain injury and blast-overpressure risk date back to 2011. The reporting says those warnings did not sit in isolation. They were followed by later testing, reviews and internal assessments that continued through at least 2017.

One of the examples cited in the reporting is Diggerworks, which is said to have used blast gauges during Exercise Chon Ju in 2016 to measure high-frequency, low-level exposure. The report says that testing was aimed at understanding exposure from weapons used by Australian personnel.

The reporting also says the material showed most of the documented exposure came from friendly weapons in training and operations, not from combat with an enemy. That detail matters because it suggests the risk was not limited to frontline blast events or major incidents.

The Daily Telegraph report says some internal reviews found friendly weapon systems could exceed blast-exposure safety requirements. It also says Defence concerns about blast overpressure and Australian soldiers were raised in the documents reviewed for the story.

A further document in the reporting is a 2017 report by retired Army Lt Col Paul Scanlan, which the paper says has now been made public through an FOI request. On the account in the report, the release of that paper adds to the chronology of warnings inside Defence rather than replacing earlier concerns.

The chronology

The timeline in the reporting begins in 2011, when Defence is said to have started warning internally about the risk of blast-related brain injury from its own weapons.

By 2016, Diggerworks was reportedly using blast gauges during Exercise Chon Ju to measure exposure. The reporting presents that as evidence that the issue had moved beyond general concern and into direct measurement of the environment in which personnel were training and operating.

In 2017, the Scanlan report was completed, according to the story, and later released under FOI. The Daily Telegraph says the material remained relevant because it reflected ongoing internal awareness of the risk.

The longer chronology is what gives this report weight. It is not just a snapshot of one memo or one test. The reporting describes a multi-year record in which Defence was warned, tested, reviewed and still did not move to a comprehensive program.

Royal commission context

The story sits inside the broader debate created by the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide. The commission handed down its final report on September 9, 2024.

Guardian Australia reported in December 2024 that the federal government gave in-principle support to establishing a brain injury program and said a new taskforce would consider it. That reporting provides the policy backdrop for the new FOI-based allegations.

The Daily Telegraph report says the royal commission recommended a brain injury program to better understand and mitigate repetitive low-level blast exposure. In other words, the issue was not only whether the risk existed, but whether Defence and government had translated that knowledge into a durable response.

That gap between recommendation and implementation is now central to the story. If Defence had been aware of the risk for years, the public-policy question is not just historical blame. It is whether personnel are now being monitored, referred and protected in a systematic way.

What is still missing

The clearest unresolved point is whether the Australian Defence Force has launched any dedicated brain injury program at all. The Daily Telegraph report says no comprehensive program exists.

The available public record described in the research does not yet show a durable surveillance system, a formal referral pathway or a single, clearly established brain injury program for blast exposure. The government’s earlier in-principle support, as reported by Guardian Australia, did not itself amount to a finished scheme.

That uncertainty matters for serving personnel and veterans who may have been exposed repeatedly over years. The issue is not limited to whether Defence once knew about the risk. It also concerns whether people who may already have been exposed are being identified and assessed now.

There is also an evidentiary gap around the full internal chronology. The reporting refers to documents from 2011, 2016 and 2017, but the exact wording and scope of each paper will matter in any wider accountability debate.

Who is involved

The reporting names the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence as the institutions at the center of the issue.

Diggerworks appears in the chronology because of its testing work. Paul Scanlan is identified in the reporting as the author of the 2017 report that has now been released through FOI.

The broader policy and advocacy context includes Vigil Australia, which is named in the reporting, and veteran and MP Phil Thompson, who is also named as part of the public discussion.

On the government side, Defence Minister Richard Marles is central because the report’s core question is whether the government has moved from acknowledgment to action. The research also places the dispute against the findings of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide.

Why it matters

Blast overpressure is the pressure wave generated by firing or explosions. In the military context, the concern is repeated low-level exposure over time, not just a single traumatic event.

If the reporting is accurate, this is a significant personnel health issue. The stakes include long-term brain injury risk, monitoring for symptoms, prevention measures during training, clinical referral pathways and possible compensation questions for affected veterans.

It is also an institutional accountability issue. A defence force that knows its own weapons may create a health hazard faces a direct responsibility to measure exposure, reduce it where possible and act early when symptoms appear.

That responsibility has political consequences as well. The royal commission was meant to drive reform across Defence and veteran support. A lingering gap in blast-injury prevention would suggest the transition from recommendation to implementation is still incomplete.

What happens next

The immediate questions are whether Defence or the Defence Minister will respond directly to the FOI documents and whether that response confirms any existing program, pilot or taskforce work.

Another question is whether further publications will surface the underlying 2011, 2016 and 2017 material in full. The original documents will matter because they could show exactly how early the warnings were, who received them and how Defence responded.

It is also unclear whether any other outlet will obtain the same FOI material or publish additional excerpts that sharpen the timeline. The new report may prompt that kind of follow-on disclosure.

For now, the reporting supports one clear conclusion: Defence appears to have been warned for years that blast overpressure from its own weapons could injure personnel, yet the public record still does not show a comprehensive brain injury program in place.