Russia 'mounted drone surveillance of European nuclear sites over 18 months'

An analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies says Russia likely ran an 18-month drone-surveillance campaign across Europe, with suspected flights over or near nuclear and military sites in several NATO countries.

The report, published on July 2, 2026, examined 144 suspected drone incidents across more than a dozen countries between late 2024 and mid-2026. AP, The Guardian and other outlets reported that the pattern appears more like a sustained intelligence operation than isolated drone sightings.

The findings matter because they point to a long-running effort aimed at sensitive infrastructure, while also showing how hard it can be for European governments to identify who launched the drones and where they came from.

What the report says

The IISS analysis says the incidents were spread across Europe and often involved airports, military sites and other sensitive infrastructure. It said the activity appeared designed to test air defenses and stayed below the threshold that would trigger a collective NATO response.

The report is framed as an analysis of suspected incidents, not a confirmed public admission by Russia. AP said direct attribution remains difficult, but that the reported use of shadow-fleet vessels strongly suggests Russian coordination.

Reporting cited by The Guardian said the sites included RAF Lakenheath in the UK and Île Longue in France, both highly sensitive military locations. AP said the sightings also affected locations in Belgium, the Netherlands and other countries.

The reported pattern also included repeated activity around airports, which in some cases caused temporary closures or disruption. That made the campaign a civil aviation problem as well as a defense concern.

How the campaign unfolded

According to the reporting, the campaign began in late 2024 and intensified in late 2025, when drones were repeatedly reported around airports and military sites. The incident count later peaked before the period covered by the analysis ended in mid-2026.

The timeline matters because it suggests persistence rather than a one-off episode. The pattern stretched across roughly 18 months, which is consistent with a campaign built to observe, map and pressure responses over time.

The analysis also suggests the activity declined after 2026 naval interceptions. The reporting does not say the drone pattern stopped entirely, but it indicates maritime disruption may have reduced the scope of the operation.

Suspected launch platforms

The Guardian and AP both reported that IISS linked the campaign to shadow-fleet vessels operating at sea. Shadow-fleet ships are typically used to evade sanctions, and the analysis suggests they may also have been used as launch platforms for surveillance drones.

That would help explain how drones could appear near sensitive sites while remaining difficult to trace. It also points to a hybrid method that combines maritime concealment, surveillance and deniable pressure on European security services.

If correct, the tactic would allow an actor to gather information on air-defense coverage, response times and patrol patterns without crossing into open military attack.

Countries and sites affected

The reporting identified multiple countries, including the UK, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and said the suspected incidents were spread across more than a dozen countries in total. The research packet also points to Ireland in the wider geographic pattern described by Financial Times.

The sites matter because they were not just random civilian locations. The report and related coverage say the drones were seen near nuclear-related and military sites, which makes each incident more consequential than a routine aviation nuisance.

That broader list of affected places helps explain why the report has drawn attention well beyond the individual sightings. It suggests a cross-border pattern rather than a local security failure.

Why it matters for NATO

AP reported that the incidents appeared to be part of a broader effort to map NATO air-defense gaps. The report said the activity stayed below the level that would prompt a collective alliance response, even as it exposed vulnerabilities.

That is a significant point for European security planners. A campaign can still be strategically useful even if it does not trigger Article 5 or a public military response, especially if it reveals where defenses are thin.

The issue is not only whether the drones were launched by Russian actors. It is also whether current air-defense and port-surveillance systems are designed to detect a campaign that uses commercial shipping lanes and repeated low-signature incursions.

The report also raises the question of how much disruption European governments are willing to absorb before moving to stronger counter-drone measures. That has implications for airports, nuclear sites, naval bases and other critical infrastructure.

Official reaction and attribution limits

AP reported that Denmark's prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, called the Danish incidents the most serious attack on Danish critical infrastructure to date. That reaction underlines how seriously governments are treating the disruption even when attribution is not publicly definitive.

The research packet notes that governments have been cautious about public blame, and the report itself is careful to distinguish between suspected incidents and confirmed attribution. That caution is important because it means the strongest public case still rests on analysis and circumstantial evidence rather than an admission from Moscow.

Still, the combination of repeated sightings, the geographic spread and the reported maritime link has made the case politically salient. Even without definitive public attribution, the report adds pressure on governments to explain how they are hardening defenses.

What happens next

The main open question is whether governments will publicly confirm independent intelligence that supports the report's attribution. So far, the strongest public claims remain based on IISS analysis and media reporting around it.

It is also unclear whether NATO or the European Commission will produce a coordinated response. National defense ministries may instead move first with tighter counter-drone measures, port monitoring or additional protection for critical infrastructure.

The report arrives amid broader European concern about drone sightings, airspace incursions and hybrid pressure tactics that have grown since 2024. That makes the IISS findings part of a larger security pattern, not an isolated episode.

The next developments to watch are any formal NATO or national government responses, any independent confirmation of launch platforms, and whether countries announce new surveillance or counter-drone steps after the report.